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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UINTAH FREIGHT LINES, a cor-
poration; SALT LAKE TRANSFER 
CO~IP A~TY, a co-partnership; and 
ASHWORTH TRANSFER COM-
P ANY, a co-partnership, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and GUY PRICHAR.D, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 7420 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To eliminate duplicity, defendants concede that the state-
ments in plaintiffs' brief to the middle of page 4 are generally 
true. It is submitted that the balance of plaintiffs' Statement 
of Facts, constitutes counsel's paraphrasing of facts tending 
to reflect the case in the best possible light for plaintiffs. It 
is further submitted that a casual reading of the record indi-
cates that much other pertinent evidence, possibly not so helpful 
to plaintiffs, has been omitted. 
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The compelling fact that between July 19, 1948 and July 
7: 1949, defendant Prichard had been granted some 17 tem-
porary permits to haul commodities outside of his former 
authority (R. 43), but inside the authority unanimously granted 
by the Commission in this case, is discounted with a flourish 
by plaintiffs on page 8 of their brief, with the somewhat accu-
satory generalization that the (<Protestants have taken the 
position that these were wrongfully issued by the Commission 
and that such do not constitute any evidence of convenience 
2nd necesity.'' We suggest that the Commission is undeserving 
of such a sweeping indictment. Particularly is this true in 
view of the fact that of all the counsel named on plaintiffs' 
brief, only Mr. Pugsley personally appeared at the hearing 
of this matter. 
In passing, it appears significant to us that of about 40 
carriers or interested parties notified of the hearing (R. 7), 
only 8 entered appearances. Three of these, the Barton Truck 
Lines, the Union Pacific and Uintah Freight Lines (one of 
+he appellants), were represented at said hearing by neither 
counsel nor other person. Three are plaintiffs herein, and 
two, the Carbon Freight Line and Rio Grande Motorways-
the only two having offices and terminals along with Prichard 
in Carbon County-are not appellants here. 
Although plaintiffs declare wrongful the issuance of 17 
temporary permits to Prichard within a year, we must insist 
that the Commission did not act ·wrongfully, but rather in 
consonance with the exigencies of a general situation, and 
that approval of these temporary permits is strong evidenct 
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justifying the granting of Prichard's application, and demon-
strating convenience and necessity. 
Although the Court, in examining the record, will find 
tnuch evidence omitted in plaintiffs' brief, we beg indulgence 
to supply some of said omissions here, all of which tend to 
;ustify the order of the Commission, which, according to a 
]ong line of authority handed down by this Court, should not 
be disturbed. 
Mr. Prichard testified that quite often he was called upon 
to furnish the service requested in his application (R. 67), 
11nd that in many cases he had received temporary permits to 
do so (R. 68) . On~e he was requested in the middle of the 
night to perform such service (R. 71). People would call him 
for such service most any hour of the night (R. 73). He was 
called one evening with a request for next day service; that 
he satisfactorily performed the same, and did so in every 
case (R. 76). He has aided Carbon Freight Lines, one of 
the protestants, on occasion in unloading vault doors, and a 
generator, the facilities of that company being inadequate 
to perform the service (R. 79) . He has also assisted the Rio 
Grande Motorways, another protestant not appealing here, 
in hauling casing, the job requiring Prichard's special equip-
ment (R. 80-81). Prichard has an office in Carbon County, 
maintains a telephone, has his number in the telephone di-
rectory, has ads in the directory and newspapers and maintains 
a warehouse at Thompson, Utah, where some of his equipment 
is stationed (R. 82). With the exception of the Uintah 
Freight, none of the appellantes maintains such service in the 
Eastern Utah area. Prichard also maintains a business contact 
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in Vernal (R. 83). A temporary permit was granted him 
;vithin a month before the hearing (R. 84). A Mr. Young 
called him requesting that he haul cement from Devil' s Slide 
( R. 90-91) . He hauled transformers to Salt Lake on Carbon 
Freight Line's permit (R. 92). Carbon Freight, a protestant, 
does not have necessary equipment to haul large tanks or 
caterpillar tractors (R. 98) and did not have necessary equip-
ment to unload vault doors, which required Prichard's as-
sistance (R. 108), and that Prichard has assisted Carbon 
Freight in other instances (R. 109). A Mr. Gamber requested 
Prichard to haul some large pipes for him, and upon being 
advised Prichard had no temporary permit, called long dis-
tance to Salt Lake and the Salt Lake Transfer Co., protestant 
and appellant here, delayed transportation of the commodity 
from a Thursday to the following Tuesday (R. 112-113, 124, 
167). It was necessary for Prichard to unload the commodity 
because this carrier had no facilities for unloading (R. 114). 
Mr. Gamber testified that Eastern Utah was developing 
(R. 115), that he had witnessed the birth and growth of Horse 
Canyon, the Kaiser Fuel Co., and the boom of the Sunnyside 
J\1ine, dormant before the War (R. 1 i6); that Prichard had 
hauled a large tank for his ~ompany and that his service \vas 
satisfactory (R. 117). He further stated that last January 
\vas the best month in his company's history (R. 122) and that 
during shut-down periods, heavy hauling was necessary for 
revan1ping the plant (R. 123); that it would be a great con-
venience if Prichard could render the service requested, par-
ticularly since the Salt Lake Transfer, one of the appellants, 
had not known the destination for delivery in the instance 
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experienced by Gamber with that company (R. 126, 128), and 
that he \vas inclined to give Prit l \ard the haul since he knew 
the district (R. 127). . 
Mrs. Leonard, District Representative for Robison 
Jvfachinery Co., covering Carbon, En1ery, Grand, San Juan 
and Uintah counties, who was well acquainted with Eastern 
lJtah, testified that he believed there was a definite need for 
someone in that area to .do heavy equipment hauling and that 
his customers frequently inquired about hauling and the cost 
thereof, and that it would be a matter of convenience to him 
(R. 130-135). 
Mr. Nielson, a contractor, having need for transporting 
of heavy equipment, has used Prichard and his work was sat-
jsfactory, other than the wait involved in obtaining permits 
(R. 136). He stated there was a need for hauling heavy 
equipment from Salt Lake to the area (R. 137), that there 
\Vas new activity in the area in coal (Kaiser Mine) and in the 
uranium industry, which latter was definitely growing (R. 
J 38) ; that it was a matter of convenience to have Prichard haul 
for him, even if he had to wait to obtain a special permit (R. 
1.40-141), and that from his life-long experience in the area 
he believed it would be a matter of convenience to the p~ople 
in the area to have Prichard's . requested service (R. 141) . 
Also, that the canal company with which he was connected, 
had had trouble with a shipment of pipe hauled by Ashworth, 
one of the appellants, requiring . the employment of Prichard 
to .pull .the Ashworth equipment in, and to complete the haul. 
A~hworth' s equipment also failed to have adequate unloading 
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equipment (R. 145-146) and had too small a truck for the 
load (R. 147). 
Mr. Larsen, a hardware dealer, stated that on the basis 
of past experience, it would be a matter of convenience to 
use Mr. Prichard's service in any hauling from points outside 
of the area into the area (R. 151), and in his past experie~ce 
it would have been a matter of considerable inconvenience 
if he had not been able to use Prichard's service, both fro1n a 
standpoint of time and expense (R. 153). 
Mr. Jackson, a coal dealer, testified as to an instance where 
(:arbon Freight, in delivering heavy equipment,. was not equip-
ped to unload it, and dropped a heavy generator, damaging it 
(R. 187), after which Prichard was called upon with his 
equipment to load and transport the equipment (R. 188), 
and that in the future it would be a matter of convenience to 
him to have Prichard haul for him from Salt Lake to his 
property (R. 189) ; that Prichard had heavy equipment avail-
able that other carriers in the area did not have (R. 196); that 
there is an advantage in having such equipment in the area 
(R. 198) ; that rail shipment out of the area is too slo'v 
(R. 200). 
Mr. Campbell of Vernal, testified that he \vas incon-
venienced and lost $200 because of a shipment delayed by 
.A.shworth, one of the appellants (R. 205) ; that the deadhead 
vlould be smaller with Prichard in hauling frotn the area to 
any other place in the State (R. 209) and that it would be a 
1natter of convenience to have Prichard haul heavy equiprr1ent 
from the area to points o~tside of the area (R. 210). 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Sims, Manager of Salt Lake Transfer, one of the 
appellants, admitted the bulk of his equipment was in Salt 
Lake (R. 164); that he had no office in Eastern Utah and that 
anyone from the area desiring his services would have to write 
him, wire him, or telephone him (R. 177); that there was 
increased activity in the area (R. 180) ; that there was greater 
activity in Vernal, Monticello and Moab (R. 183). 
Mr. Ashworth, one of the appellants, admitted that the 
Gilsonite industry has developed in Eastern Utah in the past 
:, years (R. 218-219) and that oil development in Uintah 
\vill increase, and that there will be an increase in hauling 
there (R. 219) . 
Mr. Smith, Manager for Rio Grande Motorways, protest-
ant, but not an appellant, admitted that his company loaded 
only pieces up to 12,000 pounds and that it would have to 
rent a· crane from someone to unload it at its destination (R. 
228) ; that they had loading equipment only at Salt Lake, and 
none in the area, and that they had no facilities to set up 
rnachinery (R. 231); that they could not transport a cater-
pillar of overall width (R. 232), and that he would have to 
make extraordinary arrangements for unloading anything 
over 5 tons out of the Salt Lake area (R. 233). 
No one appeared for or testified for Uintah Freight Lines, 
one of the appellants here. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
, : THERE IS ABUNDANT COMPETENT EVIDEI~CE 
IN THE RECORD TO SUSTAIN THE COMMISSIOI~)S 
FINDINGS AND ORDER THAT PUBLIC CONVENIENCE 
l!'"ND NECESSITY REQUIRE THE EXTENSION OF . .1\P-
PLICANT'S AUTHORITY. 
We feel that the first four Assignrnents of Errors reached 
py the plaintiffs raise but one question; i. e., is there sufficient 
e,vidence in the record to sustain the action of the Commission. 
We will therefore treat plaintiffs' first four points under this 
one h~ading. 
Regardless of the generalizations of plaintiffs, it is re-
·spectfully submitted that on the whole record there is. an 
abundance of substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
findings and order. The long line of this Court's decisions, 
the last of which seems to be the Goodrich case, makes useless 
the citation of authority for the proposition that the Com-
·Jnission' s findings will not be disturbed unless not based . on 
'any substantial evidence. None of the generalizations n1en-
t.ioned is a substitute for the unanimous findings of -a Com-
lnission experienced in the matters which are the subject of 
·this case. 
At this juncture we wish to point out that plaintiffs 
indulge in an inconsistency when, on page 12 of their brief 
they qliote the report of the Commission which states public 
'Convenience arid necessity require transportation between. points 
i"f/ Utah where the origin or destination of the movement ~is 
10 
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in Uintah, Duchesne, Grand, Carbon, Emery, Wayne and San 
Juan counties, basing its order thereon, and then on page 13 
state that Hthe Commission made no finding that any area 
c,f ·the State of Utah other than Wayne County required the 
service of Guy Prichard outside his original six counties. 
Before discussing other parts of plaintiffs' brief and the 
cases involved, we suggest at this point that the Goodrich case, 
cited on p. 15 of plaintiffs' brief with approval, is ( 1) not 
anal go us to our case and ( 2) does not support plaintiffs' 
theory that the Commission should give existing carriers first 
chance to satisfy convenience and necessity. This Court is 
thoroughly familiar with the case, and we simply point out 
that a contract carier problem was involved there, not a common 
carrier problem as here. Furthermore, it was obvious that 
granting contract carrier permits to serve only four shippers 
was not in the public interest, which required the broade~~· 
service supplied by a common carrier. Even though the Uintah 
Freight Lines offered to furnish additional service after the 
,i pplicants had filed their petition, the Commission sustained 
· t"he Uintah' s protest, and this Hon. Court upheld the Corn·-
Jnlsston' s refusal to grant the authority requested, the Court 
saytng: 
((The Commission is in a much more favorable po-
sition to determine the benefits and detriments of the 
two competing systems than is this court." 
The same Uintah line, which espoused that decision upholding 
the wisdom of the Commission's decision, now would ignore 
and discount the quoted passage and prefer to say, as it did 
·in its brief on page 8 that the ((Protestants have taken the po-
ll 
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sition that these ( 17 temporary permited granted to Prichard) 
were tvrongfully issued by the Comtnission and that such do 
not constitute any evidence of convenience and necessity.'' 
This is the same sort of inconsistency as heretofore mentioned. 
As to the plaintiffs' contention that existing carriers should 
have first chance to satisfy the requirements of convenience 
and necessity (p. 16 Brief), our Court has spoken on the 
s11;bject, not in the Goodrich case, but in Salt Lake & Utah R. 
Corp. vs. P.S.C., 106 Ut. 403 P(2) 647, 1944, 'vhen it said: 
t (Whether or not the existing common motor carrier 
should have been given a further opportunity to fur-
nish the required services before allowing a competing 
motor carrier to enter the field is a matter of policy 
which is entirely within the province of the Public 
Service Commission.', 
On p. 16 of plaintiffs' brief a quotation from Utah Light 
8{ Traction vs. P.S.C., 101 Ut. 99, 118 P(2) 683, is set forth, 
apparently to convince that our Court is committed to a principle 
that if there is existing adequate service, there should be no 
duplication thereof by granting new authority. Attention is 
respectfully called to the language quoted and the significant 
phraseology that condemns a duplication only that rrunfairly 
~nterferes" with existing carriers. In our case the Commission 
most obviously found that there would be no unfair interference 
\vith existing carriers. We can agree with counsel's o\vn state-
!nent on p. 17 of the brief, that factually, the very case they 
cite with approval presents ((not at all the problem which faces 
the Commission and the Court in the case at bar.n Better 
had counsel quoted other excerpts from the case, such as: 
12 
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and: 
or: 
{{The paramount consideration is the benefit to the 
public, the promotion and advancement of its growth,'' 
HI£ the Commission's determination finds justification 
in the evidence, it is not a law question and we cannot 
review or modify it or set it aside,'' 
{{True, existing carriers benefit from the restricted 
competition, but this is merely incidental in the solu-
tion of the problem of securing adequate and per-
manent service. The public interest is paran1ount." 
Obviously the Public Service Commission adopted the 
philosophy of the language last quoted, based upon the evi-
dence before it. 
A word must be said about McCarthy vs. P.S.C._, 111 Ut. 
--189, 184 P ( 2) 220, cited by plaintiffs. We respectfully submit 
that this case is not in point. All o£ the ev_idence conclusive! y 
indicated that the applicants wanted to continue as, and in-
tended to hold themselves out as contract carriers, not as 
common carriers, but made their application for common carrier 
rights under a mistaken belief that they were required so to 
do in order to comply with the law and perform the strictly 
contract carrier duties they had been pursuing. There is no 
semblance of similarity in fact or fancy to our case, there being 
3 complete absence of evidence to support applicants in the 
McCarthy case. The language of the Court seemed to indicate 
that there may have been a different result had the applicants, 
like Prichard, expressed a willingness and ability to perform 
the requested service. The Court quoted approvingly from 
Fuller-Topance vs. P.S.C., 99 Ut. 28, 96 P(2) 723, with respect 
to necessity and convenience, in apparent disagreement with 
13 
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plaintiffs' contention that .present adequacy of service should 
eliminate granting of any new authority, when it said: 
t(But a service is not necessarily adequate because 
the community can (get by,' can conduct its business 
without further or additional service. To be adequate 
the services must meet the requirements of the public 
convenience and necessity in such a way that the·needs, 
growth and welfare of the community are reasonably 
met and supplied." 
It is submitted that there is ample evidence in our case 
upon which the Commission's findings can be sustained, fron1 
the standpoint of the needs, growth and development in the 
Eastern Utah area. 
On pp. 23-24 of their brief, plaintiffs have unwittingly 
1nade · an inaccurate statement not supported by the record. 
After stating, that the protestants introduced testimony that 
iheir service had been satisfactory, counsel states that all of 
the evidendce indicated such protestants were able to render 
additional services within the area. Attention is directed to 
the fact that Uintah Freight Lines, appellant here, had neither 
counsel nor other representation at the hearing, and offered 
no evidence whatever, except by filing a financial statement 
and list of equipment. 
In passing, reference to language in Mulcahy vs. P.S.C.J 
101, Ut. 243, 117 P(2) 298, may be apropos in generalizing 
as to the attitude of this Court toward ( 1) review of the Com-
tnission' s findings, ( 2) convenience and necessity, and ( 3) 
~vhether existin~ carriers should have any pre-etnptive rights: 
14 
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Hit is not required that the facts found by the Com-
mission be conclusively established, nor even that they 
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. If there 
is in the record competent evidence from which a 
reasonable mind could believe or conclude that a certain 
fact existed, a finding of such fact finds justification 
in the evidence and we cannot disturb it. 
t tThe statute should be so construed and applied as 
to encourage rather than retard mechanical ap.d other 
improvements in appliances and in the quality of the 
service rendered the public, and should look to the 
future as well as the present, providing not only for 
present urgent need, but such as may be reasonably 
anticipated from the probable growth of population, 
industry and community development. 
t (Having given due consideration to those matters 
the Commission determines whether the existing car-
riers or a new one should be permitted to render the 
proposed service. If the Commission's determination. 
finds justification in the evidence, it is not a law ques-
tion and we cannot review or modify it or set it aside." 
And apropos of plaintiffs' implied contention that Prichard 
should not be allowed enlarged authority because of inter-
ferencewith plaintiff's rights, our Court in Union Pacific vs. 
P.S.C. 1 103 Ut. 459 135 P(2) 915, stated: 
ttln the exercise of its power to grant or withhold 
certificates of convenience and necessity, questions of 
impairment of vested or property rights cannot very 
well arise. No one can have a vested right to be free 
from competition, to have a monopoly against the 
public. And unless some justifiable question arises, 
unless some point is juridically present, this court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative 
tribunal, charged by law with carrying out matters of 
non-judicial character." 
15 
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A point is made in plaintiffs' brief that since no witnesses 
appeared from many counties in Utah, there is no evidence 
of need for any service in such counties. Counsel might as 
well have said that there were no witnesses from the hundreds 
of cities. and towns in Utah and therefore authority to haul 
to such cities and towns could not be granted because of lack 
of evidence. · The Commission, through its experience and 
~rom facts presented to it, is justified in making orders that 
apply to areas of the State-in this case, the area represented 
by the counties in which Prichard has heretofore been con-
fined, as related to the area of the State outside the ambit of 
his former authority. The Commission may authoritatively 
conclude that service into an area from various points outside 
the area justifies the granting 'Of authority to cover contiguous 
or similar points outside the area, to satisfy a public need 
and convenience. There is testimony in our case, given by 
competent witnesses, whom the Commission is entitled to be-
] ieve, that public convenience would be served if Prichard's 
authority were extended to include movements originating 
in the Eastern Utah area, destined for points generally situated 
outside the area, and to include movements originating 
generally outside of the area, destined for points inside the 
area. Such testimony, coupled with all other evidence adduced, 
.l ustifies the Commission in designating the counties within 
which Prichard may initiate movements, for consignment 
outside said counties, and in designating all other counties 
of the State as points where a movement may initiate providing 
its destination is found in the counties assigned to Prichard. 
A.ny other interpretation, as has been suggested, would burden 
an applicant with the necessity of bringing witnesses not only 
16 
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from each county, but from each city, town and hamlet in the 
State. 
Plaintiffs refer on p. 14 of their brief, to Sec. 76-5-18, 
!i.C.A 1943, which states what the Commission may do in a 
given case, included in which is a discretionary authority to 
issue certificates for less authority than that requested. The 
Commission exercised such discretionary authority in this 
very case. Prichard asked to extend the circle of counties in 
'vhich he could operate to Daggett, Wayne, Piute, Garfield, 
Sanpete, Kane, Sevier and Wasatch. The Commission denied 
~uch request with respect to 7 of the 8 counties requested, 
granting permission only in Wayne County. It is respectfully 
submitted that the Commission must have weighed the evidence 
carefully, and the contention of plaintiffs that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in this case, has no merit. 
Had its decision been arbitrary and capricious, there seems to 
be no logical reason why it should have excluded the seven 
counties mentioned. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION DID MAKE A FINDING AS TO 
TI-IE ADEQUACY OF THE TRANSPORTATION SERV-
ICE PRESENTLY RENDERED AND AVAILABLE TO 
THE PUBLIC. 
We think it should be pointed out that the authority 
granted to the applicant involves the transportation of com-
tnodities requiring special handling and that the record clearly 
1"/ 
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shows that this service is not furnished by the regular common 
carriers operating in the territory involved. 
Plaintiffs quote a portion of 76-5-18 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, and contend that the Commission failed to make 
a finding that the existing transportation facilities are inade-
quate. We think it proper to quote more extensively from 
that section in order to show what is required of the Comn1is-
s1.on- thereunder. 
' ( * * * Before granting a certificate to a common mo-
tor carrier, the commission shall take into consideration 
the financial ability of the applicant to properly per-
form the service sought under the certificate and also 
the character of the highway over which said common 
motor carrier proposes to operate and the effect there-
on, and upon the travelling public using the same, 
and also the existing transportation facilities in the 
territory proposed to be served. If the Commission 
finds that the applicant is financially unable to properly 
perform the service sought under the certificate, or 
that the highway over which he proposes to operate 
is already sufficiently burdened with traffic, or that the 
granting of the certificate applied for will be detri-
mental to the best interests of the people of the state 
of Utah, the commission shall not grant such certificate." 
-The Commission found that there is a considerable demand 
for the transportation facilities covered by the authority granted 
to the applicant and that the highways over which applicant 
proposes to operate are not unduly burdened with traffic and 
that the granting of the application, as restricted, will not 
be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the State 
cr the territory affected (R. 22). We submit that these Findings 
amply saisfy the requirements of Section 76-5-18. That section 
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does not require an express finding that existing facilities are 
inadequate. It does require that the Commission take into 
consideration the adequacy of such facilities, which they ob-
viously did. However, the Finding of the Commission that 
rhere is an unsatisfied demand and that the highways are not 
unduly burdened and that the granting of the application will 
not be detrimental to the best interests of the public, is in 
fact a :finding that the existing facilities are inadequate. If 
they \vere adequate there would be no unsatisfied demand. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that an examination 
of the record, in light of all the circumstances and evidence, 
and a review of the authorities our own court has handed do\vn, 
lead inevitably and unequivocally to the conclusion that the 
Commission did not err in granting to Prichard the restricted 
authority reflected in its order in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
MARK K. BOYLE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Public Service Commission 
F. HENRI HENRIOD, 
Attorney for Guy Prichard 
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